Esther M. Zimmer Lederberg Memorial Website
Eugenics
Deutsch Ostafrika

The German objective in German East Africa was to create plantations, and compel the native populations to grow coffee, cotton, millet, sisal, and sugar. Ivory was collected as well as wild rubber. The method used to create the slave laborers required was simple: hut taxes were required that had to be paid in money, not barter. (At this time, barter was used by the different tribes, whose economy was not based upon money.) Since the natives had no money, the only way to get the money to pay the tax would be to work on the plantations. The laborers were paid only enough money (in fact, the natives said they were never paid at all) to compel the natives to work. Thus this extortion was used to extract slave labour, for the work was not entered into voluntarily. The key to the entire scheme rested on military force.

"[Hermann von] Wissmann engaged in numerous punitive expeditions in the south and around Kilimanjaro, and was appointed governor of German East Africa in 1895, although he resigned in 1896, partly because he could not control the Schutztruppe which had been placed under the command of von Trotha, who outranked him. Upon his return to Germany Wissmann ... was elected as president of the Berlin Geographical Society in 1897." 1

"Following the example of Trotha in South-West Africa, the Schutztruppe's advance was conducted with the utmost brutality; they pursued a scorched-earth policy with disastrous consequences for the indigenous population. But, in contrast to his colleague in South-West Africa, the East African governor and commander, Count Adolf von Götzen, did not order an explicit extermination strategy: it was developed independently by the local troop leaders in the rebellious areas. Caption von Wangenheim described his tactics in a letter to Götzen in October 1905:

"'In my opinion only hunger and destitution can bring about their [the rebels'] final subjugation.'

"He proposed to systematically destroy indigenous settlements and fields. Götzen gave the local commanders his full support and defended their actions with the argument that they represented the only means of bringing the war to a succesful conclusion. As a result, an extremely brutal and destructive form of warfare was carried out until the end of the war in the spring of 1907. As in South-West Africa, most of the casualties were civilian. All the villages that the Schutztruppe passed through on their campaign were destroyed, stores were looted and fields burnt. The only military objective of these actions was to destroy the logistical and supply infrastructure of the rebellion. The commanders showed little interest in the effects this would have on the social and economic situation of the colony. Official statistics put the number of victims at 75,000; historians have estimated that indigenous losses were considerably higher." 2

The use of machine guns, canons, naval cruisers, in conjunction with starvation and exposure to the elements (when their houses were destroyed), was used during the Wahehe Rebellion. Possibly Trotha, as commander of the Schutztruppen in Deutsch Ostafrika BEFORE he went to German South West Africa, learned the uses of these methods in Deutsch OstAfrica. In any case, Adolf Graf (Count) von Götzen, Lothar von Trotha, Tom von Prince, Karl Peters, Eduard von Liebert, Friedrich Freiherr (Baron) von Schele and other Germans practiced genocide well before genocide was used in German South West Africa: it was standard, accepted practice by Germans.

Rebellions Against German Rule

Abushiri Rebellion, 1888-1890 (East African Coast)

The Abushiri rebellion took place on the African coast, opposite Zanzibar. This area is often referred to as the "Swahili coast". As Arab traders moved southward down the coast of Africa, they engaged in trade. As these Arab traders were often away from home for long periods of time, they engged in sexual unions with non-Muslim African women, producing mixed-race children. These children learned to speak an Arab/African pidgeon (trade language), called Swahili.
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Indeed this process mirrors exactly what happened as European traders produced a mixed-race population as a by-product of trading with the local population (Dutch Boers in Africa and New World Surinam; "Metis" in French Indian Ocean Islands as well as New World Novelle France; Quadroons, etc., with the English in the New England, Portuguese in Brazil and Angola, etc). 3
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Before 1888, the DOAG [Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft, or German East Africa Company] (and its immediate predecessor), under managing director Dr. Karl Peters, had attempted to build up the Company's African empire without really possessing the financial means to do so. The Company was assisted by a number of reserve officers of the German Army. On the Company's behalf, they had led the so-called 'expeditions' into the interior of East Africa to conclude 'treaties' with whoever was prepared to put an appropriate mark on a piece of paper. These fraudulent treaties were subsequently recognized by the Reich. Between 1884 and 1886 eighteen such 'expeditions' took place, resulting in the establishment of ten stations. Many of the responsible officers were later given commands in the Schutztruppe. 4
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When German officer Emil von Zelewski attempted to force acquiescence by the native Africans of these fruadulent "treaties". Zelewski deployed 110 German marines from a German warship off the coast, in an attempt to force a German administration upon the African population. This led to 'the Arab revolt', causing a conflict with the wealthy Islamic traders, led by Abushiri (a mixed-race leader, with an Islamic father and a Galla mother).
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Bismarck used the excuse that the coastal Moslems were engaged in the slave trade. At this time, all the European powers in Africa were engaged in the slave trade, even England that opposed only the Atlantic slave trade, never the interior slave trade or the Indian ocean slave trade.
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In any case, opposition to the Swahili-coast slave trade was a convenient excuse for Bismarck, and he could 'suppress the slave trade and to protect German interests in East Africa.' A military expedition was created by the Germans, headed by Hermann von Wissman (later, the first German colonial commissioner) and this expedition attacked Abushiri, employing the German Navy along the coast, and also using artillery. Thus was the German East African colony first started. 5

Wahehe Rebellion, 1891-1898 (East African inland areas)

The Hehe indigenous people were led by Mkwawa. They were centered circa 350 km inland from the Eastern African coast, near Zanzibar, at a stone-walled boma (fortress) with a stone fence circa 4 m high. The perimeter of the boma was 5 km in circumference, with fifty square bastions distributed at 100 m intervals. The boma was located on the Iringa Plateau, at the Little Ruaha River.
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Wissmann was replaced at this time Julius von Soden. The military, headed by Emil von Zelewski, sought to attack the Hehe with machine guns. As Zelewski was a racist who already had a low opinion of Africans, he attacked the Hehe. Zelewski was killed and his German force destroyed; von Soden appointed Captain Tom von Prince to Zelewski's former position. Von Prince, more cautious than Zelewski, built a chain of forts before resuming the attack on the Hehe. At this point (1894) von Soden himself was replaced by Colonel Freiherr von Schele; he too was directed to attack the Hehe at Iringa:
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"Schele poured shrapnel into the fortress while his machine-guns, mounted in trees, commanded the open spaces inside the boma." 6
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The Hehe had previously captured two machine guns from the Germans, but none of them knew how to operate them. Ton von Prince continued the attack on the boma using machine-guns mounted on the stone walls. Mkwawa, protected by his warriors, fled.
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Colonel von Schele was vilified for his forward, adventurous pro-war policy and resigned. He was replaced by General Eduard von Liebert in 1896. Mkwawa was continually followed and attacked until finally, his followers destroyed, Mkwawa committed suicide.
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"The situation in in the interior of the colony was far worse. Between 1891 and 1897 more than sixty campaigns were officially fought against indigenous peoples, even though local commanders reported only the more serious expeditions. (Local military commanders often secretly conducted smaller campaigns, of which even the governor was not subsequently fully informed.) The Schutztrupe found it hard to combat the flexible guerrilla strategy and staying power of the indigenous forces. They compensated for this by resorting to a policy of vandalism which had only one object -- the total destruction of the indigenous population's means of life. Villages were burnt, cattle were driven away and food reserves were plundered. Emil von Zelewski, the commander of the East African Schutztruppe, and Tom von Prince, the military commander of the Iringa district, conducted their campaigns with particular brutality. The local commanders eventually put down the rebellions in the interior by adopting a strategy of systematic starvation, directed more against the civilian population than the rebel forces. In addition to starvation, the German military commanders were helped by the continuous disunity and enmity between the different rebel groups, which severely weakened their effectiveness. At this point, the Schutztruppe could not have dealt with a united enemy." 7
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German consolidation followed. With German dominance, smallpox, rinderpest and armed resistance followed. The Germans constructed a railroad to exploit plantations, supplied by slave laborers. These plantations were cafetals, cotton, millet, sisal, and of sugar. Ivory was collected as well as wild rubber. A money hut tax was imposed specifically, used as a form of extortion to force natives to enslave themselves on the plantations. As a consequence of these ruinous policies, a significant amount of the population was destroyed. 8
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The colony was off to a good start.

The Maji-Maji Rebellion (1905-1907) 9

"A settler named Steinhagen — Bwana Kinoo — owned the cotton plantation at Samanga. This is how the work was organised:
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"During the cultivation there was much suffring. We, the labour conscripts, stayed in the front line cultivating. Then behind us was an overseer whose work it was to whip us. Behind the overseer there was a jumbe [ruler], and every jumbe stood behind his fifty men. Behind the line of jumbes stood Bwana Kinoo himself. Then, behold death there! And then as you till the land from beginning to end your footprints must not be seen save those of the jumbe. And that Selemani, the overseer, had a whip, and he was extremely cruel. His work was to whip the conscripts if they rose up or tried to rest, or if they left a trail of their footprints behind them. Ah, brothers, God is great — that we have lived like this is God's Providence! And on the other side Bwana Kinoo had a bamboo stick. If the men of a certain jumbe left their footprints behind them, that jumbe would be boxed on the ears and Kinoo would beat him with the banboo stick using both hands, while at the same time Selemani lashed out at us labourers." 10
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"The rebellion began among the stateless peoples of the south-east and extended to the newly created states of the Southern Highlands. It took place at the moment of transition from the nineteenth-century economy to the colonial order and it began as a movement of highlanders and frontiersmen resisting incorporation into the colonial economy and reduction to peasant status. To uproot cotton was therefore an apt ultimatum. To the men of Nandete, in the Matumbi highlands north-west of Kilwa, cotton symbolized the foreign penetration and control which had followed defeat in the 'war of the pumpkins' seven years earlier." 11
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"Behind all these particular grievances lay the face of an alien rule:
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"All these are words that buzz like bees. If you had experienced it, you would have known how grave it was. To be chained, to be shot with bullets in the grown of one's head and in one's chest, while in addition you carried loads as the great eye of heaven rose up! Alas, such was life, and those iron chains were many — he made them in his own country. Better remove such suffering; fight him off so that the loads are carried by the askari themselves." 12, 13
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"[The Matumbi] ... needed to ensure that every clan would join the rebellion and to find an answer to German firepower." 14
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"These questions were answered by a prophet named Kinjikitile Ngwale. He lived at Ngarambe, below the western slopes of Matumbi, and held no position of authority until mid 1904, when Hongo possessed him. Hongo was a spirit subordinate to Bokero, the chief diety ..." 15
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"Kinjikitile built a huge spirit-hut where all could communicate with their ancestors. He distributed a medicine - the maji (Ki-swahili for water) of the rebellion's name - to protect men against European bullets. He took local beliefs in divinity, possession, and medicines and amalgated them into a new, dynamic synthesis which promised the people unity, leadership, and protection." 16, 17
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"Kinjikitile taught that Africans were one and that his medicine — the maji of the rising's name — was stronger than European weapons. His teaching spread among the people living around the River Rufiji. It reached the Matumbi through a whispering campaign they called Njwiywila:
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"Njwiywila means secret communication such as at a secret meeting. At that time if you listened to Njwiywila you paid one pice. That was the meaning of Njwiywila. The message in Njwiywila was like this: 'This year has been a year of war, for there is a man at Ngarambe who has been possessed — he has Lilungu. Why? Because we are suffering like this and because ... we are oppressed by the akidas. We work without payment. There is an expert at Ngarambe to help us. How? There is Jumbe Hongo!'[African ruler] This Njwiywila began at Kikobo amongst the Kichi, for they were very near Kinjikitile. It spread to Mwengei and Kipatimu and to Samanga. But the people of Samanga did not believe quickly. It spread quickly throughout Matumbi country and beyond. In the message of Njwiywila was also the information that those who went to Ngarambe would see their dead ancestors. Then people began going to Ngarambe to see for themselves." 18
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"Pilgrims visited Ngarambe openly in crowds, 'like a wedding procession', but their secret object was to obtain war medicine against the Germans. Kinjikitile took the title Bokero and employed assistants called hongo."19
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"The movement had begun in answer to the religious message of a prophet. The power of the maji — power over European weapons — depended on religious faith. And as the movement expanded away from the Rufiji Valley during August and September, it was again carried by the prophets. These men called themselves hongo, messengers. They carried unity and invulnerability. They called on all black men to rise against European rule. Theirs was a revolutionary, or more accurately a milennial, message, a promise to rid the world of the evils of witchcraft and European rule. It is likely that the people ... had heard such milennial teachings before, but only as attacks on witchcraft. Now this religious tradition was mobilised against the Germans." 20
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"When the headman of Nandete ordered men to carry his tax chest to Kilwa, they decided, without consulting Kinjikitile, to declare war by uprooting cotton." 21
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"Wearing the dark kaniki cloth favoured by Bokero and with millet-stalks strung around their foreheads ... [and] uprooted cotton on a hated plantation..." 22
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Governor Götzen ... sent nearly 200 askari and police into Matumbi..." and the Germans were ambushed by rebels animated by an unusual morale. 23
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The rebels said that " 'This is not war' ... 'we shall not die. We shall only kill. ... Each clan head who accepted maji was known as a hongo and distributed medicine to his men, although there were specialist hongo ... whose job it was to rid the warriors of their fear of dying' ." 24, 25
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"'Truly we were firmly united', one [of the warriors] remembered. 'There was no tribalism in obeying the leaders.' " 26
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"August 1905 was the month of victories. By its end, German forces existed only on the coast and in the four powerful military stations at Mahenge, Kilosa, Iringa, and Songea. If they were to win, the Maji Maji fighters had to capture these stations. On 30 August, the Mbunga and Pogoro peoples tried to take Mahenge. A missionary described this greatest single action of the rising." 27
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"A fortnight earlier he [Götzen] had realized that the rebellion was more than a [local] Matumbi affray. He had telegraphed for 150 European troops ... to command 600 extra askari. European troops were refused. ... [T]he Kaiser ordered two cruisers and their marine complements from China and the Pacific [Kaiser Wilhelmsland] to dar es Salaam." 28
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The decisive battle of the Wahehe Rebellion took place at Mahenge:
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"Two machine-guns, Europeans, and soldiers rained death and destruction among ranks of the advancing enemy. Although he saw the ranks thin, the survivors maintained order for about a quarter of an hour, marching closer amidst a hail of bullets. But then the ranks broke apart and took cover behind the numerous small rocks. Now and again a group rushed out on the road, lifted one of the fallen, and quickly fled again behind the rocks. Scurrying from rock to rock they made their retreat. Then suddenly the cry rang out: 'New enemy on the Gambira [eastern] side!' Everyone looked in that direction, and there ... a second column of at least 1,200 men was advancing towards us. Fire was opened upon them immediately. The enemy sought to reach Mahenge village at the double. There they were hidden by the houses and stormed up the road towards the boma. As soon as they reappeared within range they were met by deafening fire. The first attackers were only three paces from the firing line when they sank to the ground, struck by deadly bullets. Those behind them lost courage, turned, and scattered ... When no more enemy could be seen, the Station Commander climbed down from the top of the boma tower ... and distributed champagne." 29
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Due to the great morale based upon belief in the power of maji, other tribes continued to oppose the Germans. The Sagara Uhehe area around the river Ruaha then united in opposition to the Germans. "... the hongo marching in front [of their forces] waving their whisks with which they administered maji, while their followers swayed their heads as they walked to the rattle the millet stems which ringed their foreheads." 30
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It was explained that maji failed if warriors had "... broken the taboo against sexual intercourse." 31, 32
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"The most important of Kinjikitile's teachings was multi-tribal unity, which differentiated the rebellion from ...[earlier] uprisings." 33
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Maji Maji was German East Africa's first collective political experience. 34
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Under Götzen in 1905, "Submission was compelled by patrol warfare in which military engagements were secondary to seizure of food and destruction of crops." ... "Götzen had already decided to create a famine throughout the rebel area." 35
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"German forces had no military answer to guerilla warfare. Instead, they used famine. One commander had recommended this as early as October 1905:
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"In my view only hunger and want can bring about a final submission. Military actions alone will remain more or less a drop in the ocean. The people will be compelled to abandon their resistance completely only when the food supplies now available have been consumed, their houses, have been destroyed by constant raids, and they have been deprived of the opportunity to cultivate new fields."
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"Some officers saw famine as a final solution to the threat of revolt. Captain Richter in Songea believed this:
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"When Fr. Johannes drew the District Officer's attention to the possibly imminent famine, he replied: 'That's right, the fellows can just starve. We shall be sure to get food for ourselves. If I could, I would even prevent them from planting anything. This is the only way that we can make the fellows sick of war.'" 36
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"Total deaths in Maji Maji and its aftermath are unknown. Dr. Gwassa estimates them at 250,000-300,000, or perhaps one-third of the area's total population,..." 37

Consolidation of Deutsch Ostafrika, Maji-Maji Rebellion through 1918

The German public found it difficult to accept defeat after World War I. Finding success stories (as well as scapegoats) became a propaganda objective. Although Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck didn't exactly prove victorious in Deutsch Ost Afrika, he also wasn't defeated, thus von Lettow-Vorbeck became a hero to the German public. However, exactly what did Germany under Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck accomplish?
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It is said that Vorbeck perfected a form of guerilla warfare. However, guerilla wars are always associated with nationalism. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was never associated with any form of "nationalism" in Deutsch Ost Afrika. The only form of warfare that von Lettow-Vorbeck was associated with was "bush warfare".
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Zimmermann in Deutsch Kamerun and Heyedebreck in Deutsch Togo both fought a prolonged defense of their colonies, while minimizing damage on these German colonies in terms of the loss or destruction of property and life. Lettow, on the other hand, maximized casualties. Von Lettow-Vorbeck used scorched-earth tactics to create chaos in Deutsch Ost Afrika, and to secure food and forced labourers, thus it was the natives who bore the brunt of the suffering of the war in Deutsch Ost Afrika. Von Lettow-Vorbeck was successful in diverting troops and material from being used against Germany in Europe, but at the expense of destroying Deutsch Ost Afrika.
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It has been claimed that Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck retained the loyalty of his followers (mercenary troops of askaris and Ruga-ruga) and his 45,000 porters. However, these mercenaries knew that the native populations would kill them at the first opportunity, and these loyal porters were shot if they deserted (but even then, the porters deserted at a rate of 15% per month: 90% in 6 months)! If this is loyalty, exactly what does disloyalty look like?
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Vorbeck did abandon coastlines for the most part, and fought inland to avoid engagements with Allied troops transported via the allied Navy to the coast. However, Vorbeck actually had no other alternative. Vorbeck did fight one successful battle against Indian troops under the British at Tanga ("Battle of the Bees"). These Indian troops were exhausted, ill-trained, and their British officers were over-confident as they expected to "make short of a lot of niggers". Instead, Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck made short work of the British. However, once the British started to take the colony of Deutsch Ost Afrika seriously, Vorbeck was essentially on the run for 20 months, gaining the name ‘Lettow-Fallback’. Vorbeck was not fighting a guerilla war, he was in constant tactical retreat.

Conclusion 38, 39, 40, 41

Lieutenant colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, Götzen, Tom von Prince, Lothar von Trotha, etc., continued the process of destroying the native population and ecology, essentially temporarily 'winning' a desert for Germany, which it soon lost (along with all its other colonies).
1   Jan-Bart Gewald, "Colonial Warfare: Hehe and World War One, the wars besides Maji Maji in south-western Tanzania", ASC Working Paper 63, 2005
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2   Kirsten Zirkel, Chapter 5. "Military power in German colonial policy: the Schutztruppen and their leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918", in David Killingray and David Omisi, Eds., "Guardians of empire: the armed forces of the colonial powers, c. 1700-1964", Manchester University Press, 1999, pp. 102-103.
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3   J.T. Last, "Notes on the Languages Spoken in Madagascar," in Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, London, Vol. XXV, 1896, p. 50
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4   Kirsten Zirkel, Chapter 5. "Military power in German colonial policy: the Schutztruppen and their leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918", in David Killingray and David Omisi, Eds., "Guardians of empire: the armed forces of the colonial powers, c. 1700-1964", Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 94
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5   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, pp. 91-96
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6   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 112
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7   Kirsten Zirkel, Chapter 5. "Military power in German colonial policy: the Schutztruppen and their leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918", in David Killingray and David Omisi, Eds., "Guardians of empire: the armed forces of the colonial powers, in East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918", 1999, p. 97.
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8   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, pp. 165-166
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9   Different names are used for the Maji-Maji war:
  1. The Maji-maji rebellion was also known as the pahonga.
  2. The Maji-maji rebellion was also known as the homa-homa (stabbing).
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 180
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10   See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.), "Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 5.
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11   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 168
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12   See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.), "Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 8.
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13   The Germans used two different types of black mercenaries:
  1. Askari were foreign black mercenaries, from outside the area: other African colonies or other German colonies not in Africa.
  2. Ruga-ruga were locally-recruited black mercenaries.
Because these people were used against local Africans, it was certain that if the Germans were defeated, or left, these mercenaries would be killed by the local populace.
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14   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 169
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15   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 169
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16   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 170
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17   Maji was also referred to as Maji ya uzima or "the maji of immortality". See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe, (Eds.), "Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 19.
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18   See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.), "Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 9-10.
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19   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 170
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20   See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.), "Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 17.
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21   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 171
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22   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 171
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23   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 171
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24   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 174
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25   Hongo varied in meaning:
  1. The spirit possessing Kinjikitile.
  2. The title of Kinjikitile's assistants.
  3. Any specialist that brought maji and distributed it.
  4. Anyone who distributed maji.
  5. Any warrior who took maji
  6. Efficacy, not spirit.
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26   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 174
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27   See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.), "Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 20.
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28   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 175
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29   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, pp. 178-179
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30   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 184
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31   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 186
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32   Taboos included:
  1. No white magic or witchcraft.
  2. No charms or medicines to be kept in houses; all must be destroyed by fire.
  3. No meat to be eaten unless slaughtered by cutting the throat (hallal) If anyone wants meat they must go into the bush and catch rats, and cut their throats; else the meat is unlawful.
  4. It is against the law to drink strong drink or beer of 'kimela' because these drinks have the color of blood.
  5. It is strictly forbidden to perform a marriage ceremony until the war is finished.
  6. When a man meets one of his friends, his greeting must be 'Pyuu pyuu' and the friend must answer with the same words.
  7. They must call Europeans not 'Europeans' but 'Waruteumbuchere' because their stomachs must be speared.
  8. Every man who is anointed must pay 3 pence to Hongo.
  9. Every man is to sew one pesa (coin) into the folds of his loincloth, for this will sharpen his intelligence.
  10. Every man must wear on his head a turban made from the leaves of a castor oil plant tied up with a string, and two stalks of metama, because thus the Europeans will not be able to see him.
       See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.), "Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 18.
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33   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 179
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34   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 191
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35   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 193
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36   See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.), "Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 27.
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37   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 200 refers to Gilbert C. K. Gwassa, "Outbreak and development of the Maji Maji War 1905-1907", p. 389
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38   John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika", African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, pp. 241-246
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39   Hew. Strachan, "The First World War In Africa", Oxford University Press, 2004
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40   Edward Paice, "Tip & Run", Phoenix, 2007
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41   Michael von Herff, "They walk through the Fire like the blondest German: African Soldiers Serving the Kaiser In German East Africa (1888 – 1914)", M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1991

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